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Abstract A strong assumption shared by major theoreti-
cal approaches to cognition posits that the human cognitive
system has a limited capacity for information processing.
Evidence supporting this claim comes from the dual-task
paradigm in which one cognitive system has to process two
tasks simultaneously. In this study, we examined whether
bottleneck-like processing can also be elicited when a dual
task is shared between two individuals. Under dual-task
instructions giving priority to Task 1, we found evidence of
a psychological refractory period eVect in dual-task and
joint-task conditions. Under equal priority instructions, we
replicated the Wnding of a psychological refractory period
eVect in the dual-task, but not in the joint-task condition.
These Wndings are in line with the assumption that a social
psychological refractory period eVect can be induced across
two individuals. We suggest that this eVect is due to task-
speciWc monitoring requirements. We discuss our Wndings
with respect to both dual-task and joint action theories.
Keywords Joint action · Social PRP · Dual task
Introduction
Major theoretical approaches to cognition posit that the
human cognitive system has a limited amount of capacity
for information processing and task performance. Major
evidence for this claim came from dual-task research,
showing that simultaneous performance of two choice reac-
tion time (RT) tasks leads to dramatic slowing of the sec-
ond task (Pashler 1994; Telford 1931; Welford 1952).
Since the 1950s, the psychological refractory period (PRP)
paradigm has become one of the most important paradigms
to visualize and test such processing limitations. Typical
Wndings using this paradigm are that RTs and/or error rates
in the second task (RT 2) increase when the stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA) is reduced (Fig. 1). This RT 2 pattern is
denoted as the PRP eVect and reXects additional perfor-
mance costs in dual tasks (Pashler 1994; Telford 1931). RT
1 is typically found to be relatively independent of the SOA
manipulation (Pashler and Johnston 1989).
A prominent model developed to explain this eVect is the
central Response Selection Bottleneck model (Pashler 1984,
1994). According to this model, peripheral stages (percep-
tion and motor execution) can be processed with any other
stage in parallel, while the central response selection stage
can only be processed in one task at a time (Fig. 1). In par-
ticular, it is assumed that the response selection stage is
postponed in one task until the processing of the response
selection stage in the other task is completed. According to
this model, dual-task costs have been attributed to a struc-
tural capacity limitation, which may be located at the
response selection stage (Pashler 1994) when one person
has to perform two tasks simultaneously.
However, there is now evidence suggesting that the exis-
tence of a Response Selection Bottleneck may be an artifact
of task instructions and the respective dual-task conditions
given (Schumacher et al. 2001). Meyer and Kieras (1997a,
b, 1999) developed an adaptive executive control model
derived from the EPIC (executive processing-interactive
control) architecture to account for the Wnding of dual-task
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costs emerge when strategic bottlenecks are introduced
according to speciWc task requirements (e.g., when required
by task instructions, when both tasks overlap in input or
output processing, or when participants have only a small
amount of practice with the dual-task situation). According
to the EPIC model, strategic bottlenecks can theoretically
be introduced at any processing stage, for example, percep-
tion, central response selection, or motor stages (Meyer and
Kieras 1997a, b), when inter-task coordination is required
(Liepelt et al. in pressa). Given that some studies provided
evidence for dual-task cost elimination (Schumacher et al.
2001) under optimal task conditions and suYcient practice,
an account based on optional task-scheduling strategies
may provide a more veridical explanation for the PRP
eVect. Strategic bottlenecks are adopted to optimize task
performance and fulWll task demands.
Instead of focusing on individual task performance more
recently many researches became also interested in social
task performance measuring action observation (Brass et al.
2000; Liepelt et al. 2008) or real-time social interaction
(Sebanz et al. 2003). According to common coding (James
1890; Prinz 1997), actions are cognitively represented in
terms of their sensory consequences. Action observation
may therefore lead to an internal activation of the action
eVects usually used to control one’s own actions (motor
simulation). Recently, evidence of motor simulation and
action co-representation has accumulated when two indi-
viduals share one task (Sebanz et al. 2005). Classically,
action co-representation has been investigated by using rel-
atively simple spatial compatibility tasks (e.g., the Simon
task) in an interactive context (Sebanz et al. 2003). In the
basic Simon task, participants use a left and a right key to
respond to non-spatial stimulus attributes, as for example,
red and green dots that are presented either on the left or
right side of a display. The Simon eVect refers to the Wnd-
ing that participants’ responses are slower when the spatial
relationship between the stimulus side and the response
side does not correspond than when it does correspond (De
Jong et al. 1994). The Simon eVect typically disappears
when participants respond to only one of the colors in a
Single go/nogo task (Liepelt et al. in pressb; Sebanz et al.
2003). When, however, another individual carries out the
other part of the task, responding to the complementary
color, the Simon eVect reappears (Sebanz et al. 2003).
When co-acting with another person, both participants
seem to co-represent the other person’s action (Sebanz
et al. 2003, 2005) and activate the relative response codes
in their action plans (Liepelt et al. in pressb).
Evidence of action co-representation has also been shown
in other spatial compatibility tasks, as for example, in the
social SNARC (spatial-numerical association of response
codes) task (Atmaca et al. 2008). The SNARC eVect (Deh-
aene 1992) describes the Wnding that participants respond
faster to small numbers with a left key press than with a right
key press, even when the magnitude of the number is task-
irrelevant. This eVect is explained by the assumption that the
mental number line has a left to right (small to large) orienta-
tion that overlaps with the spatial response dimension. As in
the Simon task, a social SNARC eVect was present in a Joint
go/nogo task, but not in a Single go/nogo task (Atmaca et al.
2008). These Wndings suggest that one’s own and others’
actions are represented in a functionally equivalent way
when two individuals share one task.
However, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms
underlying task sharing in more complex task situations. It is
a completely open question whether two people sharing two
tasks so that each person is in charge of only half the dual
task show evidence of a social PRP (SPRP) eVect. As we
have described, the PRP eVect has been assumed to be a cen-
tral capacity limitation in information processing when one
cognitive system has to deal with two tasks simultaneously.
This raises the question of whether we can Wnd evidence of
bottleneck-like processing and shared task co-representations
when a dual task is shared between two people. Answering
this question seems fundamental, because it has implications
for both, the understanding of capacity limitations and
resource allocation of information processing and theories of
action co-representation.
Therefore, we developed a social dual-task paradigm
where two individuals share two tasks to compare dual-task
performance within and across individuals. Using a social
Fig. 1 Bottleneck processing in dual tasks (within one person). Three
stages of processing (P perception, RS response selection, M motor exe-
cution) for Task 1 and Task 2 at short and long Stimulus Onset Asyn-
chronies (SOAs). When the SOA is long, the bottleneck stages (Stage
RS) for the two tasks are required at non-overlapping times, so both tasks
can proceed without interruption. When the SOA is short, the bottleneck
stage (Stage RS) for Task 2 must wait for the bottleneck stage in Task 1
to be completed, so Task 2 is slowed. This assumption explains the Wnd-
ing of the typical Reaction Time on Task 2 (RT 2) slowing with decreas-
ing SOA (PRP eVect) and the relative independence of Reaction Time on
Task 1 (RT 1) from the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), as shown in
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vides Wrst evidence that a SPRP eVect can be induced when
two people share two tasks.
Experiment 1
To address the question of whether two people share a com-
mon action representation when performing a dual task in a
social context, we compared the performance on PRP dual
tasks in three diVerent conditions (Single task, Joint task,
and Dual task). The dual task was made of two number
magnitude tasks. Participants had to indicate whether two
numbers appearing one above the other were smaller or
larger than Wve. Numbers were presented with a variable
SOA. Participants responded to the upper number with left-
hand button presses and to the lower number with right-
hand button presses. In the dual-task condition, a single
person performed both responses. In the joint-task condi-
tion, the task was distributed between two people. Each
individual responded to only one of the numbers. In the sin-
gle-task condition, the identical number task was performed
alone (Fig. 2). In all task conditions, both stimuli appeared
on the screen.
For a social dual-task situation, common coding predicts
that the second person acting on the second task monitors
the Wrst person’s task that commences earlier in time.
Therefore, one would predict an SPRP eVect on RT 2 (Per-
son 2) in the joint-task condition. This eVect should be
larger than in the single-task condition. In contrast theories
that assume separate coding across persons predicts that
two individuals have two separate brains and also two sepa-
rate cognitive systems. Therefore, one would predict no
SPRP eVect on RT 2 (Person 2) in the joint-task condition.




A group of 33 undergraduate students (age range: 20–35;
mean age, 24.39 years; SD = 3.79; 12 female) participated
in Experiment 1. Eleven were assigned to the dual-task
group and eleven pairs performed the joint task and the
single task. All were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and were naive with regard to the hypotheses
of the experiment. Participants were paid D7 for their
participation. Participants gave a written informed consent
to participate in the study, which was conducted in accor-
dance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1975
Declaration of Helsinki.
Fig. 2 Experimental set up used in Experiments 1 and 2. The upper
panel shows the dual-task condition, where one person has to respond
to two tasks using the index and middle Wnger of the left hand for the
upper number stimulus (Task 1), and the right index and middle Wnger
for the lower number stimulus (Task 2). The middle panel shows the
joint-task condition, where two individuals share the two tasks. The
person on the left has to respond with the index and middle Wnger of
the right hand to the upper number stimulus (Task 1) and the person sit-
ting on the right has to respond with the right index and middle Wnger
to the lower number stimulus (Task 2). The lower panel shows the sin-
gle-task condition, where one person has to respond to only one task.
Here, the person sitting on the right has to respond with the index and
middle Wnger of the right hand to the lower number stimulus (Task 2)123
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The experiment was conducted in a dimly lit, sound-attenu-
ated room. The stimuli were displayed on a 17-inch color
monitor that was connected to a Pentium I PC. Stimuli were
Arabic numerals (numbers: 1–4 and 6–9) in both tasks.
Stimuli were presented with a variable SOA (0, 100, 300,
1,000 ms) one above the other. Numbers were presented in
white on a black background. Each digit was approximately
0.8 cm in width and 1.1 cm in height. The position of the
character was indicated by a Wxation stimulus, which con-
sisted of a vertical box of 1.3 cm in width and 2.4 cm in
height. The box was separated into two parts by a horizon-
tal dash. It was presented in the center of the screen. At a
viewing distance of 80 cm, the box subtended
0.93° £ 1.72° of visual angle, with each number approxi-
mately 0.57° £ 0.79°. Experiments were carried out using
ERTS software (Beringer 2000). RTs and error rates were
measured via button presses with a response box.
Procedure and design
Both tasks were number magnitude tasks. Participants had
to indicate if the number(s) on the screen were smaller or
larger than 5. In the dual-task condition, participants
responded with the middle (<5) and index Wnger (>5) of the
left hand to the upper number stimulus and with the index
(<5) and middle Wnger (>5) of the right hand to the lower
number stimulus. Participants sat on the left or right side in
front of the monitor in the same position as in the joint and
single tasks. The sitting position in the dual-task condition
was counterbalanced across participants. In the joint task,
participants were seated next to each other; in the dual-task
and single-task conditions, an empty chair remained beside
the participant. The sitting position between the joint and
the single-task condition was kept constant: Participants
who sat on the left side in the joint-task condition also sat
on the left side in the single condition, and participants who
sat right side in the joint-task condition also sat on the right
side in the single-task condition. The logic of the sitting
position was adapted to previous studies on the social
Simon eVect (Sebanz et al. 2003). Keeping the sitting posi-
tion constant across single, joint, and standard-task condi-
tions removes potentially confounds of the sitting position
when comparing these conditions. In the single-task condi-
tion, one person had to respond to one task in isolation. In
the joint-task condition, the task was distributed between
two participants so that each individual had to respond to
one stimulus. Participants performed the same task alone
(single task) and together with a partner (joint task). In both
the single-task and the joint-task conditions, participants
responded with right-hand button presses with the index
Wnger (<5) and the middle Wnger (>5). To control for
perceptual diVerences across tasks, both number stimuli were
presented on the screen in all three task conditions.
For both, dual-task and joint-task conditions, partici-
pants were instructed to give priority to Task 1 (Pashler
1994). We asked participants to concentrate and respond
Wrst to the upper number stimulus (Task 1/Person 1) and
then to the lower number stimulus (Task 2/Person 2). In all
conditions, participants were encouraged to respond as
quickly and accurately as possible.
Participants responded to numbers appearing in the
upper or lower part of the Wxation box. Each trial began
with the presentation of the Wxation box for 1,600 ms. Both
numbers appeared for 200 ms (SOA 0 ms). For the 100,
300, and 1,000 ms SOA conditions, the appearance of the
second number stimulus was delayed by the respective
interval. Responses had to be given within 1,800 ms. If the
response was correct, the screen remained blank. If no
response was given within 1,800 ms, the feedback “zu lang-
sam” (too slow) was shown. In the case of an incorrect
response, error feedback “Fehler” (error) was provided. All
feedbacks (blank, too slow, or error) were displayed for
300 ms. After the feedback, a constant inter-trial interval
was given for 700 ms. As described, 22 participants per-
formed the single-task and joint-task conditions. Eleven of
them performed 256 trials in Task 1, and eleven performed
256 trials in Task 2. In the dual-task condition, we had
eleven participants performing 256 dual-task trials, so that
they also had 256 Task 1 and 256 Task 2 stimulus contacts.
Each large 256 trial block was split in four short blocks,
each containing 64 trials intermitted by short breaks. We
aimed to keep the trial contact per task and person constant
across all task conditions. Participants started with the sin-
gle-task condition, followed by the joint-task condition.
The dual-task condition was performed with a separate
group of participants.
Results
Errors (Task 1: 3.8%, Task 2: 4.6%) were excluded from
further reaction time analyses. RT 1 and RT 2 were ana-
lyzed separately using a two-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) including the factors Type of Task (single task,
joint task) and SOA (0, 100, 300, 1,000 ms), both factors as
within-subject variables. Additionally, we performed an
ANOVA including Type of Task (joint task, dual task) and
SOA (0, 100, 300, 1,000 ms), with the former as a between-
subject variable and the latter as a within-subject variable.
Reaction time analysis Task 2
We found a signiWcant eVect of Type of Task,
F(1,10) = 29.17, P < .001, 2 = .75, with slower RTs in
the joint-task condition (612 ms) as compared to the123
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decreasing SOAs, as indicated by a signiWcant eVect of
SOA, F(3,30) = 240.94, P < .001, 2 = .96. This eVect was
signiWcantly larger for the joint as compared to the single-
task condition, as indicated by a signiWcant interaction of
Type of Task £ SOA, F(3, 30) = 60.10, P < .001, 2 = .86.
The diVerence was largest for the 0 ms SOA, amounting to
239 ms, P < .001, followed by the 100 ms SOA, 101 ms,
P < .05 and the 300 ms SOA, 87 ms, P < .05. For the
1,000 ms SOA, the diVerence was completely eliminated,
P > .45 (Fig. 3, left panel). Comparing joint-task and dual-
task conditions, we found no eVect of Type of Task,
F(1,20) = 2.79, P > .05, 2 = .12, but numerically faster
RTs in the joint-task condition (612 ms) as compared to the
dual-task condition (656 ms). Again, the RTs increased
with decreasing SOAs, F(3,60) = 411.52, P < .001,
2 = .95. This eVect was larger for the dual-task, as com-
pared to the joint-task condition, as indicated by a signiW-
cant interaction of Type of Task £ SOA, F(3, 60) = 10.18,
P < .05, 2 = .34. While we found no diVerence between
the dual-task and the joint-task conditions in the 1,000 ms
SOA condition, the diVerence in the 300 ms SOA
amounted to 30 ms, P < .05, to 65 ms in the 100 ms SOA
condition, P < .05, and was largest but statistically less reli-
able in the 0 ms SOA condition (102 ms).
Reaction time analysis Task 1
Comparing the joint-task and single-task conditions, we
found a signiWcant eVect of Type of Task, F(1,10) = 11.96,
P < .05, 2 = .55, with faster RTs in the joint task (411 ms)
as compared to the single-task condition (457 ms). Neither
the eVect of SOA, F(3,30) < 1, 2 = .05, nor the interaction
of Type of Task £ SOA reached signiWcance, F(3,
30) = 1.59, P > .05, 2 = .14. The Type of Task eVect was
present in all SOA conditions, all Ps < .05 (Fig. 3, right
panel). Comparing the joint-task and the dual-task condi-
tions, we found a signiWcant eVect of Type of Task,
F(1,20) = 36.48, P < .001, 2 = .65, with faster RTs in the
joint-task (411 ms) as compared to the dual-task condition
(591 ms). We also found an increase in RTs with decreas-
ing SOAs, F(3,60) = 13.70, P < .001, 2 = .41. This eVect
was larger for the dual-task condition as compared to the
joint-task condition, as indicated by a signiWcant interaction
of Type of Task £ SOA, F(3, 60) = 5.33, P < .05, 2 = .21.
The SOA eVect was largest for the 0 ms SOA, amounting to
207 ms, P < .05. The 184 ms diVerence in the 100 ms SOA
was less reliable than the 173 ms diVerence in the 300 ms
SOA and the 158 ms in the 1,000 ms SOA, Ps < .05.
Error analysis Task 2
We performed the same analyses used for RTs also for
error rates (Table 1, left panel). For errors, the comparison
of single-task and joint-task conditions showed a signiWcant
eVect of SOA, F(3,30) = 4.59, P < .05, 2 = .32, which was
due to a slight error increase at shorter SOAs present in
both, single-task and joint-task conditions. Neither the
eVects of Type of Task, nor the interaction of Type of Type
of Task £ SOA reached signiWcance, all Ps > .05. When
comparing joint-task and dual-task conditions, we found a
signiWcant eVect of Type of Task, F(1,20) = 10.68, P < .05,
2 = .35, with less errors in the joint-task condition as com-
pared to the dual-task condition. Errors increased with
decreasing SOAs, F(3,60) = 5.07, P < .05, 2 = .20. This
eVect was larger for the dual-task, as compared to the joint-
task condition, as indicated by a signiWcant interaction of
Type of Task £ SOA, F(3, 60) = 3.04, P < .05, 2 = .13.
While the larger error rates in the dual-task as compared to
the joint-task conditions was reliable at the 300 ms and
1,000 ms SOAs (P < .05), we found smaller and less reliable
diVerences for the two short SOAs (both Ps > .05).
Fig. 3 EVects of stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) on reaction 
times (RTs) under dual-task 
instructions giving priority to 
Task 1 for the dual-task (straight 
lines), joint-task (dotted lines) 
and single-task (dashed lines) 
conditions of Experiment 1. The 
left panel shows RTs for Task 2, 
and the right panel shows RTs 
for Task 1123
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When comparing the joint-task and single-task conditions
(Table 1, right panel), we only found a signiWcant eVect of
Type of Task, F(1,10) = 7.19, P < .05, 2 = .42, with higher
error rates in the joint task as compared to the single-task
condition. Neither the eVect of SOA, F(3,30) < 1, 2 = .02,
nor the interaction of Type of Task £ SOA reached signiW-
cance, F(3, 30) = 1.53, P > .05, 2 = .13. Comparing the
joint-task and the dual-task conditions, we only found a sig-
niWcant eVect of Type of Task, F(1,20) = 5.76, P < .05,
2 = .22, with higher error rates in the joint-task as com-
pared to the dual-task condition. Neither the eVects of SOA,
F(3,60) = 1.52, P > .05, 2 = .07, nor the interaction of
Type of Task £ SOA, F(3,30) < 1, 2 = .004 reached the
level of signiWcance.
Discussion
Under dual-task instructions giving priority to Task 1, we
found the typical RT 2 increase, with decreasing SOA in
the dual-task condition (PRP eVect) as well as in the joint-
task condition, mimicking the typical PRP pattern (SPRP
eVect). In line with the idea of common coding, the RT 2
increase in the joint-task condition was larger than in the
single-task condition, providing evidence of an SPRP
eVect. This eVect was, however, smaller than the PRP eVect
in the dual-task condition. We found a small increase in RT
2 with decreasing SOA also in the single-task condition
when two number stimuli were presented consecutively.
The mere perception of two stimuli falling in the same cate-
gory seems to produce interference during target processing
(Eriksen and Schultz 1979). For RT 1, we found evidence
for a social facilitation eVect with faster RTs in the joint-
task condition as compared to the dual-task and the single-
task conditions. However, the Wnding of increased error
rates for the joint-task condition as compared to the single
task condition in Task 1 indicated that the RT 1 social facil-
itation eVect represents no real facilitation but can be
explained by a Speed-accuracy TradeoV (SAT) on Task 1
error rates. Most importantly, the analysis of error rates
showed that the Wnding of the SPRP eVect on response
times was not due to a SAT. In general, the error rate results
paralleled those found for reaction times though the error
rate Wndings were less reliable.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we tested whether the SPRP eVect is due
to task-speciWc monitoring requirements for Person 2, as
implemented by dual-task instructions giving priority to
Task 1. We used a similar design as in the previous experi-
ment; however, we changed the task instructions. We used
equal priority instructions (Meyer and Kieras 1997a) for
both tasks and persons. If the SPRP eVect found in Experi-
ment 1 was due to task-speciWc monitoring requirements
based on the dual-task instructions given, then the increase
in RT 2 (Person 2) should now be of approximately the
same size in joint and single-task conditions.
Method
Participants
A new group of 22 undergraduate students (age range: 20–
28, mean age 23.23 years; SD = 2.02; 11 female) partici-
pated in Experiment 2. Participants gave a written informed
consent to participate in the study, which was conducted in
accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1975
Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus and stimuli
Apparatus and stimuli were identical to the previous exper-
iment.
Procedure and design
The procedure and design were identical to the previous
experiment. In Experiment 2, the order of conditions (joint
task and single task) was counter-balanced across pairs of
participants whereas the dual task was always performed at
the end within the same group of participants. All participants
Table 1 Mean percent error (PE) for Single-task, Joint-task, and Dual-task conditions for the four Stimulus Onset Asynchronies (SOA 0 ms, SOA
100 ms, SOA 300 ms, and SOA 1,000 ms) separately for Task 2 (left panel) and Task 1 (right panel) of Experiment 1
Task 2 Task 1
Single task Joint task Dual task Single task Joint task Dual task
SOA 0 1.7 3.7 7.1 4.0 4.8 2.8
SOA 100 4.8 2.8 7.7 4.3 4.8 2.0
SOA 300 5.3 2.6 11.4 4.0 4.5 1.7
SOA 1,000 1.4 1.1 5.1 1.7 6.3 4.0123
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and dual-task conditions) completing 256 trials in both,
Task 1 and Task 2. As in Experiment 1, each large 256 trial
block was split in four short blocks, each containing 64
trials intermitted by short breaks. The sitting position was
kept constant across all three task conditions (single task,
joint task, and dual task). Participants remained on their sit-
ting position during the entire experiment. Most importantly,
we changed the task instructions for both the joint and dual-
task conditions; Participants were instructed to give equal
priority to both tasks (Meyer and Kieras 1997a; Schumacher
et al. 2001). We asked participants to respond as quickly and
accurately as possible in both tasks.
Results
The data were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment
1, with the factors Type of Task and SOA with two-way
ANOVAs both factors as within-subject variables. In
Experiment 2, the comparison of joint-task and dual-task
conditions was now analyzed as a within-subjects factor
since these conditions were given to the same group of par-
ticipants. Errors (Task 1: 0.6%, Task 2: 1.0%) were
excluded from further reaction time analyses.
Reaction time analysis Task 2
For the comparison of the joint-task condition with the sin-
gle-task condition, we found no eVect of Type of Task,
F(1,10) < 1, 2 = .07. The RTs increased with decreasing
SOAs, as indicated by a signiWcant eVect of SOA,
F(3,30) = 529.27, P < .001, 2 = .98. We found a signiW-
cant interaction of Type of Task £ SOA, F(3, 30) = 3.85,
P < .05, 2 = .28, which was based on a diVerence of 22 ms
due to faster RTs in the joint-task condition as compared to
the single-task condition in the 1,000 ms SOA condition.
For all other SOA conditions, RTs did not diVer between
the joint-task and the single-task conditions (all Ps > .18).
Comparing the joint- and dual-task conditions, we found a
signiWcant eVect of Type of Task, F(1,10) = 83.18, P > .05,
2 = .89, with faster RTs in the joint-task condition
(461 ms) as compared to the dual-task condition (649 ms).
RTs increased with decreasing SOAs, F(3,30) = 226.86,
P < .001, 2 = .96. The eVect was larger for the dual-task
condition as compared to the joint-task condition, as indi-
cated by a signiWcant interaction of Type of Task £ SOA,
F(3, 30) = 81.36, P < .001, 2 = .89 (Fig. 4, left panel). We
found a signiWcant diVerence between the dual-task condi-
tion and the joint-task condition for all SOA conditions
(SOA1000: 28 ms, SOA300: 173 ms, SOA100: 180 ms,
and SOA0 ms: 371 ms, all Ps < .05).
Reaction time analysis Task 1
Comparing joint- and single-task conditions, we found no
eVect of Type of Task, F(1,10) < 1, 2 = .03. Further, we
found no eVect of SOA, F(3,30) = 1.71, P > .20, 2 = .15.
However, we found a signiWcant interaction of Type of
Task £ SOA, F(3, 30) = 3.84, P < .05, 2 = .28, which was
due to a small RT increase in the joint as compared to the
single task in the short SOA conditions. This increase was,
however, not reliable (SOA 0, P > .55 and SOA 100,
P > .13). Comparing the joint- and the dual-task conditions,
we found a signiWcant eVect of Type of Task,
F(1,10) = 93.73, P < .001, 2 = .90, with faster RTs in the
joint-task (425 ms) as compared to the dual-task condition
(646 ms). We observed an increase in RTs with decreasing
SOAs, F(3,30) = 15.16, P < .001, 2 = .60. This eVect was
larger for the dual-task as compared to the joint-task condi-
tion, as indicated by a signiWcant interaction of Type of
Task £ SOA, F(3, 30) = 13.26, P < .001, 2 = .57 (Fig. 4,
right panel). We found a signiWcantly stronger RT slowing
eVect with decreasing SOA in the dual-task condition as
compared to the joint-task condition (SOA1000: 193 ms,
SOA300: 210 ms, SOA100: 203 ms, and SOA0 ms:
281 ms, all Ps < .001).
Fig. 4 EVects of stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) on reaction 
times (RTs) under equal priority 
instructions for the dual-task 
(straight lines), joint-task (dot-
ted lines) and single-task 
(dashed lines) conditions of 
Experiment 2. The left panel 
shows RTs for Task 2, and the 
right panel shows RTs for 
Task 1123
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The comparison of single-task and joint-task conditions
showed a signiWcant eVect of SOA, F(3,30) = 8.17, P < .05,
2 = .45, which was due to a slight error increase in the
shorter SOAs in both, single-task and joint-task conditions
(Table 2, left panel). The Type of Task eVect, F(1,10) =
10.11, P < .05, 2 = .50, indicated higher error rates in the
joint-task condition as compared to the single-task condition.
The interaction of Type of Type of Task £ SOA, did, how-
ever, not reach signiWcance, F(3,30) < 1, 2 = .07. The com-
parison of the joint-task and the dual-task condition showed a
signiWcant eVect of Type of Task, F(1,10) = 3.21, P · .001,
2 = .67, with slightly more errors in the joint-task condition
as compared to the dual-task condition (Table 2, left panel).
For these two conditions, we did not Wnd a signiWcant inter-
action of Type of Task £ SOA, F(3, 30) = 1.49, P > .05,
2 = .13.
Error analysis Task 1
The comparison of joint-task and single-task conditions only
showed a signiWcant eVect of Type of Task, F(1,10) = 7.86,
P < .05, 2 = .44, with higher error rates in the joint task as
compared to the single-task condition (Table 2, right panel).
Neither the eVect of SOA, F(3,30) = 2.89, P > .05, 2 = .23,
nor the interaction of Type of Task £ SOA reached signiW-
cance, F(3, 30) < 1, 2 = .03. Comparing the joint-task and
the dual-task conditions, we also found a signiWcant eVect of
Type of Task, F(1,10) = 7.66, P < .05, 2 = .43, with higher
error rates in the joint-task as compared to the dual-task con-
dition (Table 2, right panel). Neither the eVects of SOA,
F(3,30) = 1.01, P > .05, 2 = .09, nor the interaction of Type
of Task £ SOA, F(3,30) < 1, 2 = .07 reached the level of
signiWcance.
Discussion
Using equal priority instructions, we found a small RT 2
increase with decreasing SOAs in the joint-task condition.
This RT 2 increase did not diVer from the increase found in
the single-task condition. These two eVects were, however,
smaller than the RT 2 increase found in the dual-task condi-
tion. The direct comparison to the dual-task condition has,
however, to be taken with care, because the dual-task con-
dition was manipulated within the same group of partici-
pants in Experiment 2, which may have eVects of power on
the analyses.
Despite the use of equal priority instructions, we found
evidence of a standard PRP eVect in the dual-task condi-
tion. This result pattern conWrms that the SPRP eVect
previously found in the joint-task condition is due to task-
speciWc monitoring requirements. In Experiment 2, we found
no evidence of social facilitation for RT 1.
An additional interesting Wnding we observed for Task 2
in the joint-task condition and the single-task condition of
Experiment 2 (as well as in the single-task condition of
Experiment 1) was a RT 2 increase from the 300 ms SOA
to the 100 ms SOA and then a drop at the zero ms SOA.
One possible explanation for this Wnding is related to the
notion that the mere perception of two stimuli falling in the
same category leads to interference during target process-
ing (Eriksen and Schultz 1979) when both number stimuli
were presented consecutively. When Person 2 prepares a
response to the lower stimulus and the upper stimulus
appears slightly earlier in time as, in the 100 ms and the
300 ms SOA, target interference cannot be avoided. How-
ever, when both stimuli appear at the same time (zero ms
SOA) Person 2 may be able to directly focus attention to
Stimulus 2 (the lower number stimulus) reducing possible
interference from Stimulus 1 (the upper number stimulus).
The error analyses showed that the Wnding of a similar
response times increase with decreasing SOA in single-task
and joint-task conditions cannot be attributed to a SAT.
However, for both, Task 2 and Task 1, we found signiW-
cantly higher error rates for the joint-task condition as com-
pared to the single-task condition and also when compared
to the dual-task condition. This error eVect was, however,
unspeciWc with respect to the SOA. These Wndings may
indicate the presence of some kind of unspeciWc social
interference eVect also present in the joint-task condition
under equal priority instructions, which is neither sensitive
to the amount of temporal overlap between tasks nor was it
task speciWc (Task 1, Task 2).
Table 2 Mean percent error (PE) for Single-task, Joint-task, and Dual-task conditions for the four Stimulus Onset Asynchronies (SOA 0 ms, SOA
100 ms, SOA 300 ms, and SOA 1,000 ms) separately for Task 2 (left panel) and Task 1 (right panel) of Experiment 2
Task 2 Task 1
Single task Joint task Dual task Single task Joint task Dual task
SOA 0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.5
SOA 100 1.3 1.8 1.0 0.6 1.2 0.5
SOA 300 0.5 1.4 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.2
SOA 1,000 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.3123
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the SPRP eVect found for the joint-task condition in Exper-
iment 1, which was sensitive to the amount of temporal
overlap between tasks, is due to task-speciWc monitoring.
Conclusions
Using a dual-task paradigm previous studies showed evi-
dence for capacity limitations when one cognitive system
has to process two tasks simultaneously. Most studies used
the PRP eVect, as a marker for structural (Pashler 1994)
and/or strategic (Meyer and Kieras 1997a) bottleneck pro-
cessing. In the present study, we examined if bottleneck-
like processing can also be elicited when a dual task is
shared between two individuals testing coordinated cogni-
tion and action in multi-person performance.
Using a social dual-task paradigm, the present study pro-
vides Wrst evidence of a social PRP eVect when two indi-
viduals share two tasks. This SPRP eVect depends on the
task demands given. While it was present under instruc-
tions giving priority to Task 1 (Pashler 1994), it was dimin-
ished under instructions that gave equal priority to both
tasks (Meyer and Kieras 1997a, b; Schumacher et al. 2001).
These Wndings are in line with the assumption that the
given task-monitoring requirements produce the SPRP
eVect.
Common coding (James 1890; Prinz 1997) assumes a
shared representational space for two people sharing a task
(Sebanz et al. 2003). According to common coding, the
SPRP eVect may be explained by the assumption that Per-
son 2 is internally simulating speciWc aspects of the task
performed by Person 1 that commences earlier in time. One
way to explain the present Wnding of a SPRP eVect is the
assumption that the performer of Task 2 may have inter-
nally monitored or supervised the action or the correspond-
ing action eVects produced by the performer of Task 1. The
Wnding of a diminished SPRP eVect under equal priority
instructions suggests that common coding for self and other
does not occur automatically when two complex tasks are
shared. This seems to be diVerent to task sharing situations
where two persons share one task, as in the social Simon
paradigm where co-representation seems to be a more auto-
matic process (Sebanz et al. 2003). One potential reason for
this diVerence may be that the social PRP eVect confronts
participants with two tasks that, at least in principal, may be
conducted separately.
Crucial for the question of whether a person monitors
another person’s task, in our social dual-task paradigm,
seem to be the demands of the task. In the present study,
task demands were manipulated via task instructions,
changing the task requirements and thus eliciting social co-
representation. But which requirements are most central for
Task 1 monitoring producing the SPRP? For us, the most
plausible explanation is that the Task 1 priority instruction
used in Experiment 1 may have prompted participants to
monitor the stimulus and/or the response of Person 1,
which may lead to the SPRP. What seems fascinating here
is not that participants are able to adopt their performance
to speciWc monitoring requirements per se, but that task
monitoring across two individuals is able to produce a
response time distribution for Person 2 (SPRP) that mimics
the typical PRP pattern.
The Wnding of a general error rate increase in the joint-
task condition as compared to both, single-task and dual-
task conditions found in Experiment 2 (and also for Task 1
in Experiment 1) may indicate that even under equal prior-
ity instructions a social dual task may additionally induce
some kind of unspeciWc interference for both tasks and per-
sons, which was, however, not sensitive to the amount of
temporal overlap between both tasks. Even under social
dual-task conditions, actions of another person may have an
impact on one’s own actions, even when the task that has to
be performed does not require taking the actions of the
other person into account (Sebanz et al. 2003).
If more cognitive processes, such as response selection
(Pashler 1994), are also subject to co-representation cannot
be answered with the present study, but this will be an
exciting question for future research on coordinated cogni-
tion and action in multi-person performance. Further, the
present Wnding of the SPRP eVect shows the strength of
task instructions on shared task performance. Our conclu-
sions are in line with recent Wndings showing that co-repre-
sentation does not only rely on online feedback about the
other person’s actions but can be grounded in oZine infor-
mation (Vlainic et al. 2010) such as task instructions.
Common coding across minds, as deWned here, has
remarkable similarities to the strategic bottleneck account
proposed for individual dual-task processing (Meyer and
Kieras 1997a, b). According to the EPIC model, structural
limitations are mainly related to physical constraints of the
peripheral motor systems. For individual task performance,
task monitoring may be understood in terms of strategic
variations that are based on participant’s attempts to satisfy
task demands (Howes et al. 2009) and particular task
instructions. Participants adopt speciWc processing strate-
gies varying from cautious to daring task scheduling
(Meyer and Kieras 1997a) to optimize task performance
and fulWll task demands. Which strategies are adopted in a
speciWc dual-task situation mainly depend on the task
demands that are set. In the social dual-task condition, these
demands may relate to Task 1 priority. According to the
strategic bottleneck account, Person 2 may adopt a more
cautious task-processing strategy in order to satisfy these
demands. In line with the Task 1 priority instruction given
in Experiment 1, it seems likely that cautious task process-123
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(Meyer and Kieras 1997b) in Person 2 depending on
response execution monitoring in Person 1 when multi-per-
son coordination is required. The present Wndings of the
SPRP eVect under conditions of shared dual-task process-
ing cannot be easily explained with the assumption of a
structural capacity limitation made by the Response Selec-
tion Bottleneck model (Pashler 1994) without making fur-
ther assumptions. When a structural bottleneck would drive
the SPRP eVect, the eVect should have been much more
independent from the task instructions given. As we found
a diminished SPRP eVect under equal priority instructions,
our Wndings are more in line with the assumption of volun-
tary strategic bottlenecks as with involuntary structural bot-
tlenecks for a social dual task situation. Further research is
clearly needed to specify and further test the idea of task
monitoring for the SPRP eVect under multi-person coordi-
nation requirements.
If this is true, can the standard PRP eVect (within one per-
son) found in the dual-task condition of the present study also
be explained by task monitoring? Under the assumption of
similar resources underlying social and standard PRP eVects,
the answer would be yes—this may be the case. However,
we found the standard PRP eVect to be larger than the SPRP
eVect, and we also found a standard PRP eVect in the dual-
task condition under equal priority instructions. In the stan-
dard PRP eye movements may take additional time when
moving from the top digit to the bottom digit, lengthening
Task 2 response times especially at short SOAs. Further-
more, the two tasks we used required bi-manual responses,
which may have produced additional motor-output interfer-
ence in short SOAs when one individual has to perform two
tasks at the same time. Just like the SPRP eVect in the joint-
task condition, the standard PRP may be attributable to cho-
sen strategies of task scheduling revealed by task instructions
and the types of tasks chosen (Liepelt et al. 2011; Meyer and
Kieras 1997a, b; Schumacher et al. 2001).
Taken together, the present Wndings provide Wrst evi-
dence of a social PRP eVect when two tasks are shared. The
concept of action co-presentation may be extended from
one task (Sebanz et al. 2005) to two tasks, at least under
certain dual-task conditions.
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